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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

NOllUlVIICHI KAZURA, CalsleOINlo.
FRANK E. ROBERTS, HAROLD F. ROBERTS, BE TH )
PURDUE, ROBERTA BERRY
and CAROL BUNNELL,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to condemn, for the construction
of the Salt Lake County Civic Auditorium, a parcel
1Jf ground occupied by what was known as the Colonial
Hotel, owned by defendants. The taking included the
entire parcel upon which the Hotel was located. The
1

County obtained occupancy of the Hotel property in
May of 1966; has demolished the Hotel building; anu is
constructing the Auditorium on the site. Appellant is
the plaintiff, Salt Lake County, herein ref erred to as
"plaintiff." Respondents are referred to as "defendants."

DISPOSITION IN LO\V.ER COURT
The case came on for trial before the Honorable
Leonard W. Elton and a specially impaneled jury to
hear this case on the 15th day of May, 1967; after 4
days of trial the Court declared a mistrial and the case
was re-set for trial before Judge Elton.
During the first trial the Court made numerous
rulings on contested legal issues of which the parties
were aware at the second trial. One such ruling was
that evidence of the appraisal value for tax purposes
was inadmissible. This occurred after one of the owners,
Harold Roberts, testified, without being asked, that the
County had appraised the property at $130,000.00 for
tax purposes. The County protested vigorously and
asked that the Court instruct the jury to ignore that
comment. The Court overruled plaintiff's objection and
refused to so instruct the jury. On cross-examination
counsel for the County asked what the assessment was
and then asked the witness if he was familiar with the
statutes requiring that said assessment be at a specified
percentage of actual market value. On defendant's objection at that point, the Court reconsidered the whole
matter, heard arguments of counsel with respect to it,
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and studied the matter overnight. On the following
morniug he iustructecl the jury to disregard the witness' comment about the valuation for tax purposes, and
the cross-examination that related to it. Plaintiff conteuds that that incident contributed substantially to the
Court's later decision to declare a mistrial.
Another such ruling was that a purported offer of
the L.D.S. Church to buy the Robert's property was
inadmissible because of its uncertainty. Defendants,
after opportunity to do so, could not establish that an
offer had been made by the L.D.S. Church or anyone,
nor could they establish, since the conversation which
they attempted to construe as an offer involved a trade
of property, what the amount of the off er was.
The case was eventually retried before Judge Elton and another specially impaneled jury and a verdict
was reached. Plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial
which the Court refused and this appeal was instituted.
In the course of the appeal proceeding, it was discovered that a substantial part of the cross-examination
of plaintiff's chief appraisal witness was missing from
the record. Inquiry indicated the Court Reporter could
not locate his notes of the missing testimony. Counsel
for both parties met with Judge Elton to consider how
the record should be completed. On defendant's motion,
the Court instructed counsel for both parties to make a
statement of their recollection of the missing evidence
and proceedings. Plaintiff thereafter filed a statement
of proceedings and defendants filed objections thereto,
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together with a supplemental statement. Plaintiff ob.
jected to defendant's statement and filed in support of
said objection, an affidavit of the witness whose testimony was in question. On defendant's motion the Court
ordered that the witness' affidavit be stricken, commenting that the question whether it should be so
stricken, could be considered on appeal. The Court then
authorized plaintiff to make a further responsive state·
ment of proceedings in support of its objection to
defendant's statement. Judge Elton then observed that
he had no independent recollections of the missing testimony and only very brief notes concerning it and indicated that he would, by way of settlement and apprornl
of the record as required by Rule 75 (m), merely trans·
mit the statements of counsel for both parties without
adding to them.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a new trial and a decision of the
Supreme Court defining the limitations of expert testimony on value based on income.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
As condemnation cases go, this one should have
been easy; the taking was of the entire parcel, hence,
there was no severance damage; the parties agreed that
the highest and best use was a continuation of the
existing use and they further agreed that the value of
the property taken depended primarily upon the income
4

il would produce. Then: remained only the questions - how much income the property would produce and based
on that income, what was its value as of April 14, 1966.

The property was a 3rd or 4th class hotel ( R-354
Jiue 18 and 668 line 28), located at 144 'Vest 1st South
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. It was built between
1880 and the turn of the Century (R-250 line 16, 353
line 22 and 667 line 30) ; a five story brick building on
a sandstone foundation, that almost entirely covered the
parcel of land on which it was built.
It had been leased by the Roberts family since
1943 ( R- 231 line 6). The lease was a gross lease of
the entire property and provided that the owner should
pay the taxes and do the maintenance work on the
structure itself. The owner also incurred expense for
insurance ( R-389-392 also 612-614). The lessee, from
1943 to 1957, was Fujio Iwasaki who operated the Hotel
and a restaurant in the basement ( R-231 line 6). In
Hl57, lwasaki's lease was assigned to Harry Takenaka
(R-2.J.7-248) ·who operated the Hotel until it was taken
by Salt Lake County. The assignment of Iwasaki to
Takenaka was without consideration, but Takenaka paid
Iwasaki for the personal property ( R-254 line 10). The
gross rent charged to Iwasaki was $500 per month in
Hl42 or 1943, and was increased to $650 per month in
1953 (R-246-247). The rent was renegotiated shortly
after Takenaka took over and was again fixed at $650
per month (R-404-405). In 1961 Frank E. Roberts
sold the property to his children. Shortly thereafter,
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the children raised the rent iu midterm to $700
per month (R-405-406 and 611). Harold Roberts testified that they attempted to raise it higher on several
occasions, but were unable to get the operator to agree
(R-405 line 25). The rent was again renegotiated at
the end of the lease term in 1963 by the Roberts children
and again fixed at $700 per month ( R-406 line 3), the
amount in effect when the property was taken by the
County. During the last five years of the operation of
the Hotel, the Takenakas earned from the total operation thereof, between $4,274 and $8,491 (R-592 line 8).
That amount represented the return for the labor of
Mr. and Mrs. Takenaka and their daughter, all of whom
worked in the Hotel (R-594 line 29, 595 and R-562
line 15). It also represented the profit returned to them
as a result of their enterprise.
Both Roberts and Loll, witnesses for defendants,
agreed that the operation of the Hotel by the Takenakas
was fair or average (R-398 line 28, 489 line 1 and 50U
line 17).
The County's appraiser determined the income
producing potential of the property on the basis of the
gross rent received by the owners for 25 years (R-612617), which he determined to be fair and reasonable by
comparative analysis (R-617 line 22 and 641 line 18).
Defendants and their witnesses ignored the 25
years of income experience to these owners and also
the results of the actual operation of the Hotel over
that time. What they did, over the repeated objections
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01' plaintiff (R-282 line 30, 283, 373 line 7, 377 line 18
and :~80 line 1) was present a hypothetical income and
expense statement based on what they claimed the income and expense should have been, not as critique of
the Hotel's actual experience, but as a completely hypothetical projection of an imaginary operation (Roberts
H-376-38.J. and Loll ll-J.51-459). Essentially their testimony was, that there were A rooms; the rent per room
should haw been B; the occupancy rate should have been
C; and the expenses should have been D; leaving an
iinaginary profit of E, which when capitalized indicated
the nilue of the Hotel to be X. They did not reduce the
hypothetical income to account for the contribution
thereto of personal property used in the Hotel ( R-524
line 21), nor did they attribute to such income a profit
for the enterprise of the operator. By their projected
analysis the net income should have been $16,.i70 (RJ59 line 7), after deducting wages of $7,500 (R-457
li11e 1.5) ; whereas income received by the actual operator
varied from $2,7.J.J. to $8,491 before deducting wages
for Takenaka, his wife and his daughter (R-592 line 8).
(In fairness it should be noted the Takenakas' operating statement showed as an expense the payment of
rent to the owners, whereas the defendant's hypothetical
statement, being a purported projection of the operating potential of the Hotel itself did not. Plaintiff conternls that the fact that the Takenakas as operators,
were able to earn only a subsistence income after payment of the rent to the owners indicated the rent was
fair.)

7

Defendant's chief appraisal witness in his value <le.
termination excluded the influence of what he described
as institutional buying of the LDS Church in the area
(R-449 line 26, 511line25, 517 line 24, and 522 li11e 27).
Witnesses for both parties agreed that another
available means of determining the value of the Hotel
was by comparing it with the sales of similar hotels
(R-671 line 26 and R-449 line ) . Unfortunately, there
were a limited number of such comparable sales. There
had, however, been a fairly recent sale of the hotel about
which the witnesses for both sides testified at length
(Loll R-478-480 and 528-531, Roberts R-351, Jensen
R-367-639) and which was, probably, more than any
hotel anywhere in the world, comparable physically,
that is in terms of location, size, construction and clientele. Testimony concerning that sale was rejected (R570 and R-672-676) because the sale was from a trustee
to itself in another capacity, in spite of testimony that
the beneficiaries were acting at arms length, and that the
beneficiaries were acting at arms length, and that the
price was determined by an appraisal (R-674 line 19).
The Court further rejected the testimony of'"'erner Kiepe concerning the value of the real property on
which the Hotel was located, although the value of said
real property was a separate element of the appraisals
of each of the other appraisal witnesses (Loll R-461
line 15 and Jensen R-614 line 28), upon the ground that
Kiepe had not made an appraisal of the entire property
(R-752 line 21).
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The Court further rejected the testimony of Owen
jlcEwan, a former Salt Lake City fireman, who conducted fire drills in the Hotel within a month after it
was rncate<l. His testimony would have been about the
construction and physical condition of the Hotel in general and about its condition as a fire hazard, which would
have required extensive remodeling to comply with the
Salt Lake City Building Fire Code, and would have
rebutted testimony of defendant's witnesses on the same
subject ( R-722 and 723).
It is at least problematical, whether defendant's
highly imaginative appraisal would have taken the jury
from a realistic valuation of the Hotel property, but
for, a deliberately posed highly prejudicial question or
def en<lant' s counsel, asked of plaintiff's witness, Max
Jenson, as to whether the county's valuation of the
Colonial Hotel for tax purposes was not $130,000, accompanied by a flourish of a yellow card which def endant' s counsel handed to the Clerk for marking (R-865,
831, 868 and 87 4). Counsel of course knew that Judge
Elton had ruled that such evidence was inadmissible at
the previous trial. That counsel considered it important,
is indicated by the fact that he alluded to it, again mentioning the figure of $130,000, in his closing remarks to
the jury (R-785 line 6 and 792 line 18), even though the
witness' answer was, "he didn't know."

The defendant's spokesman, Harold Roberts, did
a similar thing when he testified, entirely unresponsively,
that the Church had made them a very substantial offer
for their property, knowing that the Court had previous-
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ly ruled that such evidence was inadmissible ( H-~Oli
line 30, 407).

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE TESTIMONY AS TO THE VALUE OF THEIR
PROPERTY BASED UPON THE CAPITALIZATION OF INCOlHE:
(A) THAT \i\T AS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
PERSONAL PROPERTY USED IN THE
OPERATION OF THE HOTEL BUSINESS.
(B) THAT \VAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
THE OPERATION OF A BUSINESS AND
NOT EXCLUSIVELY TO THE INCOME
PRODUCING POTENTIAL OF THE REAL
PROPERTY TAKEN.
(C) THAT \VAS HYPOTHETICAL, CONJECTURAL, SPECULATIVE, AND FANCIFUL, IN THE EXTREME.
The income producing potential of the Colonial
Hotel to its owners was readily ascertainable. The Roh·
erts family, the defendants in this case, had owned it
and accepted as rent therefore, amounts ranging only
from $500 to $700 per month over a period of nearly
25 years. This in the face of many opportunities and
admitted, but unsuccessful efforts on their part to
raise the rent. But the Roberts family did not look
IO

that income to establish the value of the Hotel nor
'
did they look to the operating income that the Hotel
:1dually produced, which, incidentally, indicates that
after payment of the gross rent the Hotel produced
only a bare subsistence for the operators, and thereby
reinforces the economic fairness and correctness of the
gross rent. They instead chose to speculate or project
11hat they estimated the rents should have been, the
occupancy rate should have been, the expenses should
ha,·c been, the net profit should have been and thus,
what the value should have been. The propriety of the
Roberts family saying in this condemnation case,
through Harold Roberts, speaking as an owner and as
an expert, and by Max Loll, as a property appraiser,
that the property should have produced an amount more
than 3% times the amount accepted by the Roberts
family for nearly 25 years is the question herein posed.
lu

The question is to what extent the Court should
control or limit the opinion testimony of an expert witness to require it to conform to accepted standards, the
determination of which requires the Court to act as a
sort of super expert.
Judge Elton took the position that once defendant's witnesses qualified as experts by showing they had
experience in the field over a period of time, they had
apparently unlimited discretion in the selection of prol'.esses whereby they reached their valuation opinions.
Originally, Courts viewed the testimony of expert
witnesses with a great deal of suspicion, see \Vigmore
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on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 1917 and following.
They haven't been exonerated yet, as Nichols on Eininent Domain, 3rd Edition, points out at Section 18.t
page 191.
. "There ~1as been a_ wide SJ?read and growing
distrust of expert witnesses m our trial courts.
It has been characterized as 'inconclusive and
often tainted.' In any case where expert opinion
is admissible, the particular kind of an opinion
desired by any party to the investigation can
be readily procured by paying the market price
therefore." * * *
The problem is compounded where, as here, the
opinion is based on capitalization of income. See Sackman' s Conclusion at page 6 of his speech and the ma·
terial introductory thereto, wherein he points out that
such data is used primarily where there is an absence of
comparable sales or as a subordinate factor in the determination of the value where there are such sales.
(Plaintiff has attached to its brief a copy of a speech
entitled, "Economical Approach to Valuation," giren
by Julius L. Sackman, one of the authors of Nich·
ols on Eminent Domain, while he was in Salt Lake
City. The speech which is widely distributed, contains
some 91 citations and is referred to in this brief in several
places.)
While it does impose upon the Court the role of
super expert, it is a role they have traditionally played.
As the Court in Sacramento and San Joaquin Draiwif/ 1'
District v. Reed, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847 pointed out:
12

"The approach ignores the fact that the 'prospective purchaser' is an abstraction, a ventriloquist's dummy who speaks only with the voice of
the flesh-and-blood valuation witness. In feeding
words to the fictional buyer, the witness - be he
appraiser or landowner - is confined only by
his own imagination and by such narrower limits
as the law may impose on him. A condemnation
trial is a sober inquiry into values, designed to
strike a just balance between the economic interests of the public and those of the landowner.
(See Krntovil and Harison, Eminent Domain
- Policy and Concept, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 596, 626.)
There is a limit to imaginative claims even when
described in terms of a prospective buyer's mental
reactions. To say that only the witness' valuation
opinion has probative value, that his 'reasons'
have none, ignores reality. His reasons may influence the verdict more than his figures. To say
that all obections to his reasons go to weight, not
admissibility, is to minimize judicial responsibility
for limiting the permissible arena in condemnation trials. The responsibility for defining the
extent of compensable rights is that of the
courts." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff contends that the Court has a duty to
supervise the methodolOf,"Y of expert witnesses and that
such duty required it to reject portions of the testimony
of the defendant's witnesses, Loll and Roberts initially,
and having failed that, to qualify it or caution or instruct the jury regarding it after it was in.
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!NCO.ME ATTRIBUTABLE TO

PERSONAL PROPERTY

The amount of income that <lefeudant's witnesses
capitalized included all of the rent they estimated was
obtainable from the rental of the rooms. There were in
said rooms numerous items of personal property which
were not taken by the condemnors i.e., bed, dressen.
chairs, linens, towels and other personal property (R523 line 23) .
Clearly a part of said rents were to be paid by the tenants for the use of personal property and part for the
use of the real property, of which only the real property·
was taken by the condemnor.
The proposition that an opinion as to value Lased
upon income contributed to in part by the utilization of
personal property which is not being taken, is erroneous,
is perhaps too obvious to require to citation. See, however, Sackman's comment at page 10 of his speech, al
follows:
"Obviously the rents paid by the roomers, were
based among other things, upon the use of the
furnishings as well as the rooms and, thus, were
not a proper basis for valuation of the real property. This was a business."
See also 29 CJS 2d 1201:
"Evidence of rental income for furnished
apartments is inadmissible since such reflects the
market value of the real estate plus personal
property which is not taken."

14

In the first trial plaintiff unsuccessfully objected
to defendant's projection of a hypothetical operating
)latement, by each of the 3 witnesses by which it was
introduced, because it was conjectural, it included income receiYed from personal property and it included
a profit from a business operation. In the second trial
plaintiff objected to the operating statement of Gus
Johns. The Court overruled that objection upon defense counsel's observation that it was the same procedure previously admitted (R-283 line 5). The Court
on>rruled a similar objection made at the outset of the
operating statement testimony of Harold Roberts (R373-37.J<). The Court thereafter agreed that the record
would show plaintiff's continuing objection to such
tebtimony ( R-380 line 4).
Defendants principal appraisal witness, Loll, admitted on cross-examination that the projected income
from which he made his value determination included
the contribution of the personal property and that if
that was error his opinion was oYerstated (R-524 line
28). Plaintiff moYed the court to strike the testimony
of Loll on that ground which the Court refused (R-571
line 20). Plaintiff then asked the Court to instruct the
jmy that they should not consider the value of the furniture and furnishings contained in the Hotel nor the
contribution to income of said furniture and furnishings
in determining the value of the Hotel on an income
basis, (plaintiff's requested instruction No. 14 R-182)
whid1 the Court refused. The Court did not otherwise
enlighten the jurors on the subject.

15

INCOME ATTRIBUTABLE TO PROFITS
AND/OR THE PERSONAL EFFORTS
OF THE OPERATORS
Defendants in projection of an imaginary and, of
course, optimistic, hotel operation attributed all of the
income derived from said operation to the property itself and none to the business enterprise of the operator.
Worse yet, they inferred and argued that the iuco1m
received by the actual operators was attributable to the
property, without diminution even for the salaries and
wages of the operators. See page 556 of the record
wherein defendant's counsel had defendant's witness
Loll add to the gross rent of the owner, the wages of '
the Takenakas and describe the result as the net operating income of the Takenakas. Defendant's counsel later
asked plaintiff's witness, .Max Jenson, over plaintiff's
objection, whether if you added Takenaka's operating
income to the owner's income and capitalized the result
by a cap rate of 16.5, it wouldn't indicate a value of
$100,700. Whereupon, Jenson agreed that the arithmetic seemed about right ( R-866, 835-36, 871 and
879). Defendant's counsel thereafter alluded in ar·
gument to plaintiff's appraisal, as treating only
part of the income (R-779 line 28, 781 line 25,
and 784 line 17) . He reserved for his final remark,
the direct argument that it was necessary to find the
value of the property to add the two incomes together
observing "that wasn't his testimony, it was just common sense" ( R-800 line 8) .
The authorities uniformly hold that the admission
I
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testimony a'; to niluc based upon income from the
11pera ti on of a business, particularly one which includes
the rendering of personal services, is error. Sackman
points out at the bottom of page 8 of his speech:
111

"It is, aeeordi11gly, \Yell settled that evidence
of sueh iueome is not admissable as proof of the
value of property. The profits of a business are
too uneertai11 and dependent on too many contingeneies to be safely accepted as any evidence
of the ndue of the property on which the business
is conducted."

And at the middle of Page 9:
''It follows that capitalization based upon such
incompetent evidence is not only not a criterion
of value, hut is ina<lmissable in evidence and may
uot be considered as a factor in the ultimate consideration."
See particularly Page 13 where he notes:

"Nevertheless, the fundamental concept that
ineome from business is not admissable as proof
of value of property still retains its general
validity. This is best typified by the valuation
of motels and hotels. Here the cases undeviatingl.11 hold that there is no leyal ju~tification for the
capitali:::rdion of income from the use of personal
properf.IJ and income from the rendering of perso 1w l se n ice." (Emphasis added)
1

Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, Section
lH.a, at Page 3.J.O of Yol. .5, states the rule as follows:
" ( 1) Commercial Property.

"If the owner of property uses it himself for
commerc;al purposes, the amount of his profits

17

from the business conducted upon the proper\\
depends so much upon the capital employed auJ
the fortune, skill and good management witli
which the business is conducted, that it furnishe.1
no test to the value of the property. It is, accord.
ingly, well settled that evidence of the profits of
a business conducted upon land taken for public
use is not admissable in proceedings for the determination of the compensation which the owner
of the land shall receive. Profits ~f a business
are too uncertain, and depend on too many contingencies safely to be accepted as any evidence
of the useable value of the property upon whicn
the business is carried on. Prof its depend upon
the times, the amount of capital invested, the 1.
social, religious and financial position in the community of the one carrying it on, and other elements which might be suggested. \Vhat one man
might do at a profit, another might only do at
a loss."
American Jurisprudence states the rule at 27 Am.
J ur.2d 338, Eminent Domain, Section 431, entitled
"Income or Profits," as follows:
"In the absence of a constitutional provision
or statute requiring a different rule, it is g~ner~l- ,
ly held that evidence of past or prospective in·
come or profits from a business conducted on
property is too speculative, uncertain and remote
to be considered as a basis for computing or as·
certaining the market value of the property in
condemnation proceedings."
That defendants in this case attempted to confuse
the wages of the operators with the income produced
18

uy the

Hotel property only emphasizes the need for and
the correctness of the foregoing rule.

Plaintiff in addition to its objection to defendant's operating statement testimony, above noted, asked
the Court to instruct the jury not to consider the normal profit of the operator in determining the hotel's
income producing potential, which request the Court
refused. (Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 19, R187)

INCOME \VAS CONJECTURAL
Plaintiff contends the appropriate measure of the
Hotel's income producing potential is the rents received
uy the owner, provided it was, as here, a reasonable or
fair market rent. Even though plaintiff contends it
would be inappropriate, plaintiff would not complain
in this case, if defendants used the actual operating
income of the hotel (since the actual operating income
constituted only subsistence wages for the operator, it
tends to prove that the owner's rental was at least fair
or more than fair to the owner) . But plaintiff strongly
protests the projection by defendant of a purely imaginary operation resulting in an operating income some
three and a half times that income voluntarily received
aud accepted by the owners, the Roberts family, for
nearly 25 years. (Actual net income to the owners was
approximately $4,984.00 R-392 line 1 and 394 line
U). The projected operating income which the defendants capitalized to find the value of the property was
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$16,523 in the case of Harold Roberts ( R-381 line 1
and $16,470 in the case of l\Iax Loll ( R-45!J line i 1

1

As Sackman points out, the use of the econornil
approach to valuation has been regarded by the court1
with suspicion and, accordingly, has been allowerl j11
many jurisdictions only when more cmwentional approaches were tmavailable. (See the summary of Sackman' s conclusions on this point at Page() of his spcedi. 1
A corollary requirement, apparently everywhere observed, is that when used it must not be done on a hasi1
of conjecture. See the statement at 27 Am. J ur. 2d Hi
and 88, Eminent Domain, Sec. 286 - "Income or re11- ,
tals; capitalization," as follows:
"However, the capitalization of income methu<l
should be carefully scrutinized even where appropriate. 'Vhile it may be the only useable method
under the circumstances, its use must be based
on a foundation which minimizes conjecture and
uncertainty."
Or Sackman, at Page 17:
""There, however, the process invokes the
capitalization of a hypothetical income from a
hypothetical structure and the entire proces~ i1
simply a figment of the appraiser's imagination.
the result has been uniformly rejected as con·
jectural in the extreme."
The cases giving rise to the foregoing observations
are generally those in which the landowner seeks to
show a proposed improvement and then seeks to capi·
talize the hypothetical income therefrom. Apparenth
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1

few or no landowners have had the temerity or audacity
to completely ignore the actual business operation; to
hypothesize a highly imaginative and optimistic income
and then to capitalize the imaginary result. Even
assuming defendants were entitled to capitalize a business profit as opposed to rental of a building and improvements and added to that, they were entitled to
include in said income, return from the utilization of
personal property, plaintiff's contend that they were
obligated to utilize the actual income from the operation. They do not contend they would have been bound
by the actual income, they could have adjusted it to
correct for an inferior or superior operation, but they
11ere bound to begin with reality, something that existed
in the marketplace. Otherwise, the whole foundation
of their testimony must be rejected as purely speculative
and with it the conclusions supported thereby. At first
blush, it may appear not to matter whether one starts
with the actual operation and makes adjustments that
involve speculation, or whether one just starts with
~peculation. But see the difference in the instant case.
Both Harold Roberts and Max Loll testified that the
Takenakas, who were the operators of the hotel, were
fair or good or average operators (R-398 line 28, 498
line I and 509 line 17) . At the same time, the only
possible explanation for the fact that their actual operation returned less profit than the imaginary one proposed by defendants, is that their operation was somehow inadequate or that defendants' imagination is defective.
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Two cases involving capitalization of projeded
profits and loss of profits are State v. Smith, 377 P2it
352, and State v. Bare, 377 P2d 357; both are .Montana
cases decided in 1962. l n both, the decisions of the trial
court were reversed because they allowed appraisal witnesses to capitalize, either income or loss of income, that
was determine by computation, by the appraiser, ut
anticipated costs and expenses. The court, in the second
case, said at Page 363 of the Pacific Reporter:
"Further, in this case, none of the figures,
being based on one year only, and in part pure
estimates, have such degree of certainty to be a
credible factor .... \Vhile we do not reject tht 1
method in all cases, \Ve believe for future guidance in eminent domain cases, the capitalization
of income should be carefully scrutinized erni
where it may be appropriate as one of the tools
of the judicial workshop. . . . However, its use
must be based on a foundation which minimizes
to the extent possible, conjecture and uncertainty."
1

Again, plaintiff, in addition to objecting to the
testimony as it came in, asked the court for a clarifying
instruction which was refused. (Plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 15, R-183)

POINT II
PLAINTIFF 'VAS DEPRIVED 01" .\
FAIR TRIAL BY DEFENDANTS' coUX·
SEL'S INTENTION AL l\IENTION OF A TAX
VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY IN THE
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SUM OF $130,000 AND BY DEFENDANT
HAROLD ROBERTS' MENTION OF AN OFFER TO PURCHASE SAID PROPERTY
'
BOTH BEING MATTERS \VHICH HAD PRE\'IOUSL Y llEEN RULED INADMISSIBLE
BY THE COURT.
This writer believes that defendants could not have
sol<l their inherently deficient appraisal of the hotel to
the jury, but for the combination of that appraisal as
justification for the correction of what the jurors were
le<l to believe was a tax inequity. The jurors I talked
to indicated that some of the jury held out for a time
for a verdict of $130,000 based on the taxes alone. The
situation fairly sings with poetic justice. Plaintiff is
the County. As the County, they were the tax collector,
and in the minds of the jury, who announced prior to
their selection that they were taxpayers, they were also
the tax assessor, whereas in fact, in this case of downtown commercial property, the State Tax Commission
was the tax assessor. The impact of the proposition
that the County ought to have to pay for property the
amount they claimed it was worth for tax purposes is
obvious. The consequence is that if the circumstances
of the tax valuation being before the jury is error it is
highly prejudicial error.
Let us look at the fairness of it. First, defendants
suggested to the jury that the County had made the
appraisal and not the State, which is untrue. Second,
it was done in a way and at a time that plaintiff was
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defenseless. In the first trial defendant, Harold Uob
erts blurted out, unresponsively, that the property wa,
valued by the County for tax purposes at $Iao,ooo
Plaintiff could and did then cross-examine on the sub.
ject. It could have also brought the tax appraiser in a1
a witness to determine-first, if the statement was true:
and second, the deficiency of the tax appraisal as u
determinant of market value. llut in this trial the testimony was from plaintiffs counsel after the court had,
in the first trial, declared such evidence inadmissible·
thoroughly instructed that jury to ignore it, and then
declared a mistrial partly as a result of it. Plaintiff
could do nothing but hope the jury hadn't heard, a hopt
rendered vain by counsel's again mentioning the figure
in his closing argument, in the total absence of evidence
in the record. Plaintiff couldn't even point out tha!
the testimony came from counsel and was not evide11te.
for fear of unduly emphasizing the point.
I

1

The court is familiar with the fact that the mere
mention of insurance by a plaintiff in the course of a
tort trial, as a matter of common practice, results in
the immediate declaration of a mistrial or the later,
granting of a new trial, or a reversal on appeal. See thr
annotation at 4 ALR2d 761. Courts have similarly
treated references to the wealth or poverty of the liti·'
gants, 32 ALR2d 9, and to arguments or references to
the fact that another defendant has been convicted or
pleaded guilty. See annotation 48 ALR2d 1031.
Plaintiff urges that the error here complained f11
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was, at least, as or more prejudicial than a mention of

liability insurance and under the circumstances its erroneous character was even better known to the perpetrator. Defendants should not be allowed to profit from
their flagrant and intentional commission of error in the
face of the court's rulings.
Plaintiff contends that even if the Supreme Court
should now find that evidence of the tax valuation is
admissible, it should still find it admissible in this case,
because of Judge Elton's ruling in the first trial and
the consequence that, because of that ruling, plaintiff
could not, for fear among other things of being found
in contempt, meet it. Nonetheless, precedent strongly
indicates that such evidence is inadmissible. See Nichols
un Erninent Dornain, 3rd Edition, Section 22.1 at page
~99 of Volume 5:
"It is almost everywhere the law that the value
placed upon a parcel of land for the purpose of
taxation bv the assessors of the town in which it
is situated. is no evidence of its value for other
than tax purposes. This rule of exclusion has
heen applied in the determination of value in
eminent domain proceedings."

There is an annotation entitled "Evidence - Tax
Valuation" at 39 ALR 2d 209. The general rule is
there stated at page 214 as follows:
"It is the overwhelming weight of authority
that assessd value is not competent direct evidence of value for purposes other than taxation.
Thus it has been held or stated in a large number
'
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of cases that evidence of assessed value, or other
valuation for tax purposes, at least of itself ai
determined without the participation of 'tlit
owner of the property, is not evidence of !ht
value of the property for other purposes."
In Littlcdikc v. IV ood, '255 P 17'2, our Utah Su·
preme Court reversed the trial court and ordered a
new trial, citing as error the admission of the Couuty
Treasurer's testimony as to the value of <lefendanb
lands without any foundation that the Treasurer had
any knowledge of such value except as shown by the
assessment rolls. The Court noted with approval the
reason given in the case of Hanover JV ater Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Pa. 279, that
"An assessment is merely an ex parte statement
made by an officer not subject to cross-examina·
tion and is no evidence of the value of the land
assessed."
To that should be added the comment that such
assessments are notoriously wrong, a matter about which
the Court can take judicial notice.
The defendant, Harold Roberts, did a similar
thing when he answered, unresponsively, a question on
cross-examination as to whether the acquistions by
Zions Securities didn't have anything to do with the
County's acquisition, by saying: "but it related to the
same problem. They were buying property all around
us and made definitely an off er, substantial offer, for
this property in or about that same time." ( R-406 line
27 and following)
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At first blush, his answer may appear innocent.
When you consider that plaintiff obtained a ruling from
the Court in the first trial that there should be no mention of such off er because of Judge Elton's determination that said offer was uncertain, to which ruling,
Defendant Harold Roberts had expressed his pique, it
is clear that his answer constituted a deliberate, intentional fouling of the record. Judge Elton's comment in
refusing to strike that comment upon the ground that
plaintiff had allowed the witness to explain his answer
is just not well taken, the question could have been
answered "yes" or "no."
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
REJECT OR INSTRUCT THE JURY CONCERNING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S 'VITNESS, LOLL, WHO ARTIFICIALLY EXCLUDED FROM HIS VALUE DETERMINATION THE EFFECT ON THE MARKET
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, OF
NUMEROUS PURCHASES OF THE L.D.S.
CHURCH.
Defendant's witness, Loll, in his direct testimony,
testified at length about purchases of property by the
L.D.S. Church in the area of the subject property and
about the effect of such so-called "institutional buying". ( R-436 to 439) He then testified that he excluded
this influence in his examination of the market (R-466,
27

line 10, 449 line 26, 511 line 25, 517, line 24, & 52!
line 27). He testified that the influence on the marktl
was substantial (H-518 line 18) and that its effect 11·a).
to depress the market ( R-523 line 3) .
Plaintiff moved the court to reject Loll' s testimon 1
upon the ground that he had excluded the effect of th~
Church's acquisition, although it was one of the infiu·
ences in the real market at the time (R-571 line :20 1,
which motion was denied. Plaintiff then requested a11
instruction that would have advised the jury that they
should consider all of the factors in the market at tl11
time of the taking, which request was refused. (Plai11tiff's Requested Instruction No. 18-R-186).

J

There is no evidence and it is not a fact, that the 1
Church's purchases were related to the condemnation
of the property for the Civic Auditorium. It is true
that the Church later leased the property owned b1,
them, within the designated site, to the county; but then
is no indication that they were buying for that purpose.
The proposition that defendants were entitled tr
receive as compensation the market value of their prop·
erty is too clear to require citation, but that means
the market as it is and not as it would be without ad·
verse influences. Defendants were not entitled to en·
hance the market value about which they testified b)
deleting such adverse influence.
The writer has not found a case wherein the exclu·
sion of the effect of institutional buying was criticizer!
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and accordingly, cannot assist the Court with specific
precedent. The discussion in Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, Section 18.42 ( 1) beginning at
\'olume 5, page :HO, is in point, particularly, the material in the supplement thereto.

Such evidence should have been stricken. See
Ccntrnl Illinois Light Cornpany v. Nierstheimer, 185
N. E. 2d 841, wherein the Court said:

"It is settled that where opinions of witnesses
in condemnation cases are based in part upon
elements of damage which cannot legally be
taken into consideration as well as upon elements
which would properly be taken into consideration,
these opinions do not form a proper basis for a
wrdict. (Illinois Power and Light Corp. v.
Cooper, 322 Ill. 11, 18, 152 N.E. 491) Therefore, if it appears that the opinions of the defendants' witnesses as to the value of the land
not taken were based upon improper elements
of damage, their opinions as to such a value
should not have been considered by the Trial
Court."

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
'fESTil\IONY OF DEFENDANTS' 'VITNESS,
LOLL, AND IN REJECTING TESTIMONY
OF PLAINTIFF'S \VITNESS, JENSON, RE
THE COl\IP ARABLE SALE OF THE UPLAND
HOTEL.
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There was an abundance of testimony about tht
Upland Hotel. Defendants first introduced testirn 0111 .
concerning the income received by it, its rent schedule·,
and occupancy rates, and a comparison of it physicalh
with the Roberts' property. Plaintiff introduced a pitture of it; compared it physically with the Rober\\
property; introduced testimony showing the rents ff
served to the owner; and introduced the testimo!ly r1!
its manager to show what its rents, occupancy rate;
and income actually were. There was even testimony
to the effect that the manager lived in the hotel as <l1a
the manager of the Roberts' property. Its location wa1
very near the Roberts' property; its clientele was similar)
its size and accommodations were comparable. Plain
tiff offered testimony concerning the sale of the prop I
erty in 1961 for two ( 2) purposes : ( 1 ) As a direr:
comparable, and ( 2) to prove the relationship of it·
sales price to its gross rentals and, thereby, to establisf1.
the value of the Roberts' property to determine a gr01·
income multiplier to apply to the income on the Robert1
property, the process by which plaintff's witness mad1
his principal determination of value.
The Court first rejected the sale ( R-570 line 28
when defendants' witness, Loll, on redirect examinatioi:
testified that in his opinion it was not at arms lengtl:
transaction, because it was a sale from Tracy Collu1·
Trust Co. as trustee for the Fisher 'V arehouse Corn
pany to Tracy Collins Trust Co. as trustee for fm
children of M.rs. Covey, and because the seller needel
11
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!llOney ( R-588). The Court again rejected the sale,
although, plaintiff's witness, Jenson, said that he had
considered the sale in his appraisal, that the price was
an attempt to find the market and that it was determined
by an appraisal ( R-67 4).
Our Utah Supreme Court has given serious attention to the admissability of comparable sales in two
cases, State v. Peek, 1953, 1 Ut.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 and
State v. Peterson, 1961, 12 Ut.2d 317, 366 P.2d 76.

In the Peek case, the Court stated the rule as follows:

"Thus, the price paid for similar lands, if the
time of such sale and location of the lands are
sufficiently near and the sale is made without
compulsion, is admissable in evidence on direct
examination to show the value of the lands in
question." (Emphasis added)

In the Peterson case, the Court stated the rule as
follows:
"Nevertheless, in order for evidence of other
sales to be admissable, it should appear that the
lands are generally similar, particularly, as to
factors having a bearing on values: that they
are in the same locality; are similarly situated;
have the same or similar, actual or potential uses;
are of about the same fertility, if that factor is
pertinent· that the other sale was voluntary on
the part ~f both buyer and seller." (Emphasis
added)
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.
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, does nr.1 •
state the rule comprehensively, but treats it by sub-topit,:
at Section 21.31 and 21.32. Those subtopics are:
Degree of Similarity
Proximity in Place
Proximity in Time
Comparison
and Forced Sales

The significance of the Utah and Nichols detit1i
tions is that the only qualification made by them in any
way related to whether the sale is by a trustee to tht !
same trustee for different beneficiaries is whether !Le'
sale is voluntary or whether it is a forced sale. Corn :
parable sales, to be admissable, need not contain all.
of the elements of the standard definition of market I
value, such as exposure for a reasonable time in tht
market, as suggested by defendants at the trial. The
important thing is that they relate to what an informea.
buyer was willing to pay an informed seller for similar
property. Since both buyer and seller had the benefit
of an appraisal, it is fair to say that they were highly
informed.
Forced sales are defined by Nichols at Section
21.32 of the above cited treatise as follows:
":Forces sales usually involve transactions in
which there is an element of compulsion either
on the part of the seller, who is obligated to ~cl
with undue haste, thereby affording him an Ul
adequate period in which to effect a reasoua~le
deal, or on the part of the purchaser, who !t11
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purely personal reasons or necessities, is compelled to pay a higher price than an ordinary
purchaser ~ould be willing to pay. However, it
has been said that there is a presumption, in the
technical and proper meaning of that word, that
the price of land sold was fixed freely and not
under compulsion. In the absence of evidence
warrantying finding that a sale was made under
such compulsion as to make a price inadmissable
as evidence of value, consideration may be given
as to the sale. It has been said 'involuntary' sales
imply compulsion under a decree, execution or
something more than inability to maintain the
property. The element of compulsion must be
based on legal, not economic, factors. For the
purpose of determining admissability of comparative sales, compulsion is not shown to exist where
a person is compelled by force of circumstances
to part with property which he might desire to
hold."
It is clear that the trustee in the Upland sale was
neither compelled to buy or sell in any legal or practical
~ense. The testimony of Jenson that the sale was made
on the basis of an appraisal and the experience of the
Court concerning the obligation of trustees to obtain
fair prices, of which it could take judicial notice, should
dispose of the question of compulsion.

Another possible basis of the Court's ruling, although
not identified, despite counsel for plaintiff advising the
court of the urgency of the question and requesting
the basis of its ruling in order to overcome the objection, is the matter of time. The sale of the Upland Hotel
11 as in 1961 and the time of the taking was April, 1966.
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With respect to that matter, the following items should
be noted:
·
(a) The absence of other comparable sales.
( b) The testimony that the market yaJue,
were declining (since plaintiff the party request.
ing the admission of the old sale, defendants can
only complain if prices are rising).
( c) At the time plaintiff sought to introduce
this evidence, defendants had been allowed to in
traduce comparable sales going hack further intu
1959 and 1960 upon the ground that later corn
parables were scarce because of the so-called insti
tutional buying and auditorium project itself. (R·
467 line 6 & 468 line 9) .
( d) :M.ost importantly, because the announced
principal purpose for the introduction of the Up·
land sale was to establish a gross income multi·
plier, a matter that does not change with time
\Vhile the value of the property may change the
relationship of the value to the income it will pru·
duce does not, or at least that is the hypothesi1
of the income approach to valuation.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTIM
THE PROPOSED TESTil\IONY OF 'VERNER
KIEPE ON HIS OPINION OF THE YALl1E
OF THE ROBERTS LAND AND IN REJECT

1
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IN(; THE PROPOSED TESTIMONY OF
; OWEN l\icElV AN ON HIS OBSERVATIONS
OF THE HOTEL BUILDING IN APRIL, 1966.
Plaintiff's witness, 'Verner Kiepe, acknowledged
that he did not appraise the hotel property but testified that he had reviewed all of the appraisals on the
auditorium site including the appraisals of the hotel.
He further would have testified that he had an independent opinion concerning the value of the real property upon which the hotel was located, but for an objection made to that offer, which the court sustained (R751 line 24).
Counsel for defendants in arguing for the rejection
of Kiepe's testin1ony on the value of the land said
that uumerous cases held that it was inlproper for an
expert witness to testify as to the value of the land
alone. After some search, plaintiff has failed to find
such cases. Plaintiff agrees that the value that must
be found is the value of the land with the buildings
· thereon and, further, that it is inlproper to give evidence
· as to each value separately and simply add them to, gether.
l\That plaintiff contends is that the value of the
land separately was an item considered by each of the
witnesses to value; that plaintiff was entitled to in' troduce the additional testimony of Kiepe to rebut
I the evidence given by Loll and to support that given
~ 11y .f enson; and that he was further entitled to introduce
·. that value as one of the items to be considered by the
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Jury in their overall consideration as to value. Thr
only thing plaintiff was not entitled to do was to iutru
duce evidence on the value of the land separately fruii:
that of the building and then simply add the two to.
gether contrary to the so-called unit rule.

In Cleveland Terminal and Valley Railroad Com
pany v. Gorush, 81 N.E. 1186, 1907 (Ohio), the Cour
reversed a Trial Court for refusing testimony as to t]
separate value of the land, where the land contamtti
buildings. The Court in the later case of Dernn i
Cincinnati, 162 Fed 633, 1908, commented on the G0
rush case, saying:
,
1

"But on consideration, it is evident that tl1r
value of the land enters into the value of tn1
parcel in a way the value of a building does not
If you are an expert, you may testify as to tnr
value of the land exclusively of the building·
but you cannot properly separate the building·
from the land and testify to its value wholl)
irrespective of the land."
The Court in discussing with counsel, plaintiff'·
offer of the testimony of Owen McEwan, indicated tha:
it felt that inasmuch as the conditions observed 01
McEwan did not enter into or alter the opinion of \ni
appraisal witnesses concerning the value of the RoberL
property, such testimony was superfluous and woul
be excluded on that ground. Plaintiff contends that
was entitled to rebut the testimony of defendants regarn
ing the condition of the hotel and that it is entitled I
presents its own testimony concerning the physici
1

1

ir
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condition of the landowners property. In support thereof see 27 Am. J ur. 2d, Page 324, Eminent Domain, Sec.
m-Generally; Evidence as to Value:
"As bearing upon the value of a parcel of land
taken by eminent domain, it is competent for
either party to offer evidence descriptive of the
property and its location, physical characteristics,
advantages, purposes, and surroundings. It is
ordinarily contemplated that both parties to the
controversy may submit all facts deemed by
either, pertinent to the issue, and objections going
to pertinency and relevancy should be sustained
only in extreme and plain cases."
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff respectfully
submits that it should be granted a new trial and requests that this Court determine that the Trial Court
should haYe rejected defendants' determination of market Yalue that arbitrarily excluded existing detrimental
influences of the market; that was based upon income
that was conjectural; that included return ·from
personal property not taken; and included return for
the personal services and profits of the operator of
the hotel.
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